Transatlantic Relations Conclusion

Given Professor Egan's concluding lecture on the state of Transatlantic Relations I would like to add that yes I do in fact believe that Europe needs to figure out whether it wants to be a global or a regional player. This is ONE priority. However, Europe also needs to realize that the partnership with the US has significantly changed and that it cannot count on the US as an ever-reliable ally. As we all know, the end of the Cold War utterly altered the geopolitical structure of the world. The loss of the Soviet Union as a common enemy led to a re-thinking of the existing strategic alliances including the US-EU alliance. However, it wasn't until 9/11 and the disagreements that followed regarding a variety of security issues including how to handle the Iraqi threat that Europe and the US finally realized that their alliance was one based on convenience rather than similar values and morals.
During the time period leading up to the Iraq war, we Europeans including me liked to believe that the somewhat irrational and unilateral US foreign policy was being conducted by a group of hawkish republicans who didn't really take other opinions into consideration and who were merely concerned with achieving their foreign policy goals that had been thought out a long time ago. The frustration about the US decision to invade Iraq was often directed towards the incumbent US government only, most of the time towards people such as Bush and Cheney. However, most Europeans failed to realize that the US has always acted unilateral when doing so was considered necessary to achieve its own interests. As I said previously Europeans liked to direct their anger at Bush and/or Cheney or Republicans in general and thereby disregarded the fact that Democrats such as the then next potential US president voted for the war as well. Additionally, Europeans were incapable of understanding what a devastating and traumatizing effect 9/11 has had on the psyche of American policymakers and Americans as a whole. To have the first attack on one’s own soil come in the form of hi-jacked planes flying into buildings that represent(ed) US economic or political power and killing thousands was a truly mind-altering experience which we as Europeans will never be able to fully understand (since a terrorist attack of such magnitude has never occurred on European soil). Since it is human nature to act impulsive and sometimes irrational following events of such scale the rather uncharacteristic and unilateral US foreign policy that followed can only be understood as an example of impulsive and reactionary behavior. Then again, how much of this foreign policy was actually impulsive and how much of it was calculated we will never really know.
What I’m trying to say here is that in order for us to prevent the transatlantic drift from getting worse we need to analyze and understand our differences before looking at our similarities. Europe is very different from the US in a variety of ways, which we extensively covered in class. As we all know Europe and the US approach economic issues very differently. Labor markets are rather inflexible in Europe whereas social welfare in the US is too flexible meaning practically non-existent. Indeed, both Europe and the US have democratic political systems; however the way the democratic system works in the US is quite different from the way it works in France. Additionally there are a variety of significant cultural differences, which encompass differences in religious beliefs, labor, the importance of family and many others. The differences are too long to list, but so are the similarities and it is therefore my belief that we can’t allow this partnership to waste away due to an altered geopolitical landscape and the lack of a common enemy. And yes maybe the US has less incentive to cooperate with the EU because it does not gain as much from it as the EU does from cooperating with the US, however both have so much more to gain from a flourishing and effective partnership than from a stalled and inefficient one.

-Tiago Talard

Reflections on Prof. Modelski's Presentation

Today's presentation by Professor Modelski struck me as being somewhere between overly-optimistic and fatalistic at the same time. The idea there is an unstoppable trend toward democracy (optimistic) and that there is nothing anyone can do to promote democracy other than lead by example and support other democracies (fatalistic). Maybe fatalistic is too harsh but definitely deterministic (ehh can’t find the right word). It seems logical to me that there are ways that external forces can contribute to democratization in countries that are on their way there. Does his argument mean that help with institution/capacity building, aid for development and poverty reduction, political democratic conditionality, NGOs, international exchanges, political pressure on authoritarian regimes or support of democratic opposition (the list goes on and on) are completely irrelevant to democratization? If none of that works and it is only "innovation" that leads to inevitable democratization, does that mean that foreign policy or any other efforts for democratization from the outside are completely useless? What do you think?...If I understood him correctly, I am not convinced.
Claire de Lacvivier
PS Thanks to Matt for finally hlping me figure out how to post here!

Law and Disorder

Putting aside the irony of having Henry Kissinger write an article about the ability of third parties to prosecute people for human rights abuses or crimes against humanity, I believe the article raises some good points. Each country should be able to decide on its own what will happen to its own ex-despots. Different cultures have different ideas of what a just punishment is and what constitutes illegal behavior. Anti-death penalty Europe would not like it if an Arab country tried to hang one of its former leaders. Thus each country should be left to its own to decided how to deal with past leaders that might have committed crimes.

That being said I believe there are certain crimes that should be punished by an international court. Genocide is one of those. Heinous war crimes committed during an international conflict might also apply. But I would argue that they would have to be extreme war crimes. It is too easy to say that someone targeted civilians or something similar. War is not pretty and to expect it to be a totally clean enterprise is misguided. But if a country were to use WMD’s unprovoked that might be bad enough for an international trial.

Allowing third party countries to prosecute ex-leaders opens up to many difficult questions, while achieving very little, thus I tend to agree with what Henry Kissinger is arguing.

Matt Bank

Economist Article

Its like the author of this article is giving a summary of our last few classes. Touches on everything from trade to aviation to social welfare.

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8960350

O Canada

I did a quick follow up on the crowd favorite Canadian style welfare state, or at least on the health care aspect. To answer Professor Egan's question, the healthcare system in Canada is funded at both the provincial and federal level through corporate and individual taxes like in the US. Basically the federal government hands over funds to the individual provinces, who are then responsible for the allocation as well as administration of the system. This was just a quick follow up, there is definitely a lot more to the overall system itself.

EU Approach to Fighting Terrorism

Leslie Lebl writes that the EU takes a different strategic approach to fighting terrorism than the U.S. does. When it comes to the question of “is this a fight to be conducted primarily at home, or carried abroad to the enemy?” the EU goes for the former option. Lebl asks if the EU view will grow closer to the U.S. view given its new borders.

Do you guys foresee either side revising its position? I think the U.S. is unlikely to change its tactics, but it’s harder for me to guess what will happen in the EU. As we discussed in class, Europe’s longer history of home-grown terrorists contributes to its domestic approach. But the threat of Islamic extremism would seem to demand a different approach.

If anything, I would guess the EU will increasingly work with third countries to form agreements on important issues. It has already created policies to deal with asylum seekers that seek to place a greater burden on the countries through which those people traveled to get to the EU. In the future, it could expand the scope of its counterterrorism efforts by attempting to create consequences for states that do not actively pursue terrorists.

Duplication/Changing Purposes of Organizations

During our class discussion of competing institutional architectures, I thought about Antonio Missiroli’s assertion that “The EU and the NATO that the central European applicants have recently entered are very different organisations from those they set out to join a decade ago.” It seems like a good observation. By the time these states got their membership cards, important aspects of both organizations had changed.

Missiroli says the EU has “acquired a more ambitious foreign and security policy” and moved towards “becoming a single-currency area.” He says NATO is “assuming a more global role” and the EU and NATO are essentially building the same capabilities in the same areas. Professor Egan also talked about how NATO has become a political entity.

Do you guys think this is an accurate analysis? In the case of the EU, I think one could argue that Central and Eastern European states have had the opportunity to chart the course of European integration. Common Foreign and Security Policy has been around for a while, and European Security and Defense Policy was a topic of debate several years before enlargement. Any thoughts?

Missing MIs

Nothing too substantial to say here but I though people would be interested to know that there were an MI1-MI4. Wikipedia (for what its worth) even has information on MI7-MI19.
enjoy

Matt Bank

The EU versus the East?

It's very interesting to read the three works assigned, and to see how different views are in the four major blocs in Europe (though, honestly Turkey is not a part of Europe). That is, the EU which one can divide in the original 15, and then the new 8 Eastern European, post-communist states (sorry Malta, and Cyprus, though the latter also has a history of oppression by a foreign force); Turkey, which is an important ally (though I would question its future usefulness - honestly you only need some people for a temporary amount of time in your life); and then the greatest state of them all, Russia, which today proudly boasts a nationalistic, pragmatic, autocratic, NGO hating government (but hey, the West wanted Russia to have democracy, and here it is now!).

Regardless, it's important to realize how much history affects the relationships between these four groups. The Eastern Europeans have, though not very successfully, changed their governments to something compatible with the EU, whereas Turkey and Russia have both gone their separate ways. Both have policies that do not give the autonomy or independence of those nations which are unwillingly in their states.

Turkey has demonstrated its lack of mission by not being able to do anything it has aimed for. It is not a rich state, it is not as free as it should be, and overall not fit for EU membership, not yet at least. At the same time it has failed its supposed most important ally, the USA, by not helping with the war in Iraq. Why the Kurdish people suffer, and why the Armenian genocide is still denied is beyond me, especially the fact that Europeans have not done enough to pressure the Turkish government to change its ways. I won't even get into the involvement the military has in their politics.

Russia of course is a much more complicated issue, and for fear that a visa will not be accepted when I try to go there to study their language, I won't go too far. The truth is, though, that the growing relationship between it and Turkey is worrying. The great power politics Putin is playing will bring no good to anyone, only his KGB cronies. With the growing importance of energy Europe, with the support of the US will have to do something.

In the end, once again, it's very historical. The new EU members have achieved national independence after many centuries of occupation by different powers. Of course, knowing what's good for them they ran to the EU as to get away from Russia, and with good reason. Here, the United States is not given its full importance. In many ways it is because of the US that the new states joined the EU. The EU is bigger, and stronger for it, because many Eastern Europeans saw this as the way to go for their future, one where Transatlantic relations are the basis for a secure, and open grouping and polity of free societies, as it should be.

EU presidency bus

This is totally not a substantive contribution, but I just wanted to direct you guys to this URL: http://www.germany.info/form/spot_the_bus.html

I thought it was a cute idea.

Quick Info

If anyone is looking for more material for tomorrows discussion of British nuclear arms, there are a ton of interesting links from this Wikipedia page to a number of different sites and documents, some of which I am sure are more reliable than others. The BBC has also been running a bunch of stories about the issue lately, plus (in my humble opinion) the BBC News website is very well designed and easy to use.

Key U.S. Beliefs Supported by the Example of France

Part of Simon Serfaty’s article made me think about which U.S. beliefs are fed or supported by certain kinds of anti-French sentiment. Serfaty suggests that francophobia in the U.S. implies that “were it not for the French there would be no objection to the United States in Europe.” I agree with his analysis – France makes a convenient enemy for the U.S. because it is a country that is prominent in international affairs, but ultimately doesn’t threaten our security. It’s comforting to pretend France is the main opponent of our foreign policy, because while the French might disagree with our choices, they don’t wish us harm and they don’t have a huge stake in the outcome. The same cannot be said for other parts of the world, especially those that have been negatively affected by U.S. foreign policy. Focusing on France lets U.S. citizens feel angry that our country’s actions are being questioned without having to seriously address the critiques, consider concrete threats to the U.S., or ask if some countries have legitimate grievances.

The U.S. can also hold France up as proof that U.S. multiculturalism and globalization are superior forces, despite French worries about the consequences of lack of assimilation and an Americanized mass culture. Sophie Meunier brought these issues up in her article. I think a lot of people in the U.S. believe the concept of “survival of the fittest” applies to culture and social practices. If something is taking over, this is a sign that it is inherently superior or of more value. Of course, this is not necessarily true: for example, Western-style diets are gaining popularity all over the world despite the fact that they are often less healthy than indigenous ones. Still, we see the popularity of American culture in France as proof that resistance is futile.

Finally, as Meunier notes, demonizing France for its opposition to our foreign policy serves certain purposes in the U.S. domestic context. People who might agree with French criticisms are more easily painted as unpatriotic and dismissed. This reinforces the idea that the world can be seen in black-and-white terms, and people are either with the U.S. or against it.

Trans-Atlantic Relevancy

Walter Mead suggests in his piece that Europe is increasingly seen as irrelevant by US policymakers.

The conclusion seems sadly evident that the Bush administration is pragmatic rather than doctrinal when it comes to multilateral and unilateral options. It has proceeded without closer consultation with Germany and France because it has simply concluded that Germany and France demand more attention and consultation than their support is worth.

Despite Mead's questionable assessment of "red state" political convictions, the point he raises strikes me as being critical to the discussion on how the transatlantic relationship functions or will function. The collapse of the USSR meant the loss of Europe's importance as the major theatre of a potential world war. European powers by and large lack the capacity to project significant military power. So militarily Europe is, relative to the US, weak.

Although Europe is important to the US economy, it is not the primary concern. In terms of imports and exports our immediate neighbors Canada and Mexico along with China and Japan all are bigger partners. (source: CIA World Factbook) Domestic problems within the EU complicate efforts to build an economic block that can compete with the US. The European economy is certainly a major player, but it doesn't seem like the EU has much economic leverage on the US.

All this leaves Europe looking somewhat less important to the US, especially at a time when its attention is being drawn by oil, terror, and the specter of a rising Iran in the Middle East as well as everyone's favorite East Asian boogeyman, China.

For the time being at least Europe still seems to need the US more than the US needs Europe. To reassert the importance of the transatlantic relationship the EU or some other collection of European states must gain enough power to offer meaningful opposition to US efforts outside of Europe. Until then, there are less incentives for the US to exert itself to please European allies.

-Fletcher F

To drift in dixie

I have two things I want to talk about in this post. The first is somewhat philosophical and in many ways is just me thinking out loud on the computer. The second is an analysis of the paper by Walter Russell Mead about German-American relations.

Is there a transatlantic drift?

So far that seems to be the main question we have been discussing in class, with quite a few of the papers coming down strongly on the side of a drift apart. And many of these people have come out of roles inside of the government where they worked very closely on these issues. But this raises another question, did they decided that there was a drift because of what their perceived, or did they perceive a drift because of what they believed. IR has a unique way of becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy. If the people writing papers about how there is a drift are then advising and/or working for the government they are likely to act in a manner that reinforces the drift between the US and Europe. It’s sort of like the chicken and the egg. Perhaps the drift has been created or strengthened by the fact that we think it exists. But then again maybe not. It’s just an idea.

The first thing I would like to comment on is Mead’s way of characterizing what he refers to as “Red State America.” As someone who hails from a red state, and is somewhat conservative (although not a fan of Bush at all) I found the constant religious analogies annoying. Mead refers to red state policymakers as revivalists, he comments on how it would be unlikely for Schroder to seek Baptism at the hands of Billy Graham, he declares that red staters “frequently think the unthinkable and say the unspeakable,” and then works in second Billy Graham reference. If one were to read this article they would think that everyone between the Appalachians and the Rockies was a bible thumping, xenophobic idiot. This is not a good way to try to start a strong relationship. Mead says that he has spent most his life in a blue state, but if Europeans are reading this article they will get the wrong idea. And if this is the perception that Europe holds of Middle America we are in trouble. But I would like to think that Europeans have a better understanding of America. And I can personally testify to the fact that most Middle Americans, don’t have a deep seeded animosity towards Europe and if anything would like to have better relations with them.

But how can we achieve these better relations? Mead seems to have a good idea. The Middle East is an area where both sides have important interests. And both sides would assumedly like to see a peaceful and non-extremist greater Middle East. We have seen a lot of cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program and in Afghanistan, and with a little work these instances of cooperation could be used to work towards mending relations in other areas. By starting with small steps the two sides could hopefully see that they can work together and then tackle other larger issues. The Israeli-Palestinian situation offers another opportunity for cooperation and trust building. If Europe and America want to mend their relationship the Middle East offers a great place to start.

Matt Bank

What is the State of the Transatlantic Relationship?

Anyone familiar with Transatlantic relations knows that there has been a “crisis” since the early days of the European project. So one must ask, if there really is a crisis, and if the Atlantic Community really is on the brink of rupture; though the word divorce may seem to make more sense in this case. The simple answer is no. The end of the Cold War did not bring down NATO, or indeed the EC. It has now been over fifteen years since the fall of the Soviet Union. Not even de Gaulle brought down the European integration process (though he did change it fundamentaly) in the early second half of the twentieth century.

It would seem, however, that the majority of experts as well as the informed public are incapable of creating one realistic argument on what is happening. Furthermore, there is an excessive dependence on history. The truth is that works by experts such as Kupchan, Moravscik, Kagan, and others are well aimed at some of the current problems, but alone they cannot give a complete picture. There cannot be a single factor which will dictate the future of the relationship. Perhaps if one were to argue that political, demographic, and economic changes are created divergence, then there would be a better understanding of what could happen. Better yet, a clear and simple, though extensive, theory as to what is happening would help the average citizen to be able to understand how important the relationship is.

Also, by taking a point of view, and at times a rather obvious bias, those who write about the Transatlantic relation with such a slant that it becomes difficult for certain readers to accept it, are not helping in any way. Though some would prefer to see organizations like NATO disappear, it is important to realize that without it, the world would become much more dangerous for everyone. As incapable as NATO can be in certain cases (mostly due to a select number of member states who are unwilling to send more troops to important missions, especially Afghanistan) it is still the alliance which holds together the biggest block of democratic nations. This is of no small value. The United States may be a hegemon, but it is the most benevolent the world has ever, and will probably ever see. At the same time, Europe deserves a voice in the world, so that all continents in the world are able to reach minimal levels of life sustainability, as well as human rights, something which can, and should be done through diplomacy, and soft power, with hard power only ever being used in the case of real threats.

For the time being, there is yet no concrete answer to the question of whether there really is such an incoming divorce. One could even claim that elites are causing a rift in the relationship by paying so much attention to divergences, when there are enormous cultural, political, economic, and military links. Americans love Europe, and Europeans love the United States. It is the best friendship between nations and states that the world has ever seen. Even though it is human nature to take sides, perhaps it is time to take an eclectic approach to this issue. Only through innovative approaches, can one expect the US and EU to work together to spread the values of democracy, and human rights; if indeed that is the foreign policy both wish to pursue.

NATO-ISAF...Keeping The Alliance Alive

Last week’s readings about the history of NATO, combined with this week’s articles about changes in both the relationships within the alliance and its missions have been surprisingly relevant to my job. I’ve been researching the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the work that the US and NATO are doing in Afghanistan, particularly in counternatcotics. This is an area where cooperation in the alliance seems to be very strong at the moment, in fact, Afghanistan appears to be a fairly high priority for the alliance.

For those who don’t know, ISAF is the first NATO mission outside the traditional “Euro-Atlantic” area under UN mandate 1510. Although the US did not take full advantage of NATO in the actual military actions in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban, NATO has been intimately involved in the post-military operations. The Bonn Agreement, which set up the provisional government of Afghanistan in 2001, spelled out the serious role the US and the international community would play in reconstruction, and plenty of help has been needed.

After relatively safe and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, one of the many threats to stability and security exists in warlords, local militias, and continued insurgency. These networks are funded for the most part by opium poppy cultivation, a thriving business in Afghanistan, which provides about 87% of the world’s total opium poppies. Although the revenue accounts for about 52% of the country’s GDP, the funds contribute to the movement of wanted individuals and possible terrorist funds, as well as feed into networks that traffic other things, like people and weapons. The commonly used term for these activities in Afghanistan is “narcoterrorism,” and much of the international community has labeled Afghanistan as a “narcostate” similar to Columbia.

ISAF doesn’t actively “combat” or “pursue” the perpetrators of these crimes, but their mission is to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security by tackling these issues in a variety of ways. In the past, this meant monitoring the elections, and since that time it has meant training the Afghan police force and what will essentially be “gendarmerie” and “national guardsmen.” The roughly 8,000 troops are also extensively involved in the reconstruction efforts, like the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs or monitoring the airport and airspace. To date though, the largest efforts have been put into counternarcotics programs. This includes traditional efforts like eradication, physically eliminating poppy fields, but it can also involve public information campaigns, letting those in the countryside know that it is actually illegal to grow, produce, traffic or use opium [poppies]. ISAF is also working to help the Afghan government create the necessary institutions to cope with these issues when the mandate expires.

The countries that have contributed troops to ISAF (as well as some other countries) also met January 31, 2006 to pledge additional funds to continue and expand counternarcotics efforts and other vital areas. For me, this is a significant example of the continued functioning of the transatlantic relationship, but also a perfect demonstration of how that relationship has changed. If the work in Afghanistan goes well, it might well provide a new mold for the future of that relationship. Even if it is unsuccessful, or less successful than desired, I still doubt that either side of the Atlantic will be ready or willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

-Catherine Kozak

The Real Problem with Europe

Most of what we've read so far for class has focused on the causes of the current transatlantic crisis, and whether or not it is mendable. Whether from the prospective of NATO, the EU, or individual states like Germany, France and the UK, Europeans are not agreeing with Americans as they (arguably) have in the past.

It seems to me, however, that the underlying truth of the matter is that Post-9/11 the United States is simply moving its foreign policy in a direction the Europeans can't follow. It has expanded its security interests globally, based on the assumption that instability abroad threatens security domestically. In this context, the peaceful, "post-modern" Europeans are of no longer of concern to the United States as they were in the Cold War, and because of their immobile and out-dated force structures they can hardly be expected to contribute in any real way. Giving international legitimacy, sure, but the US' global power status is pretty legimate on its own.

Several authors have made the claim that the United States is already on the decline, a superpower about to be eclipsed by a new up-and-comer. While bearing in mind the obvious difficulties of predicting the future, these recent events seem rather to characterize a United States that is more powerful than ever.

So the challenge for Europe is to craft a coherent (i.e. united as the EU) identity in response the this. But because there is still debate over and not acknowledgement of the changed geopolitical environment, Europeans have not been able to reach common consensus about the problem, let alone the solution. These guys really need to decided first and foremost who they want to be. And then do it.

-Mary Turkowski
mturkowski@gmail.com

The first post

This is the Transatlantic Relations blog for American University, Spring 2007.