NATO-ISAF...Keeping The Alliance Alive

Last week’s readings about the history of NATO, combined with this week’s articles about changes in both the relationships within the alliance and its missions have been surprisingly relevant to my job. I’ve been researching the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the work that the US and NATO are doing in Afghanistan, particularly in counternatcotics. This is an area where cooperation in the alliance seems to be very strong at the moment, in fact, Afghanistan appears to be a fairly high priority for the alliance.

For those who don’t know, ISAF is the first NATO mission outside the traditional “Euro-Atlantic” area under UN mandate 1510. Although the US did not take full advantage of NATO in the actual military actions in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban, NATO has been intimately involved in the post-military operations. The Bonn Agreement, which set up the provisional government of Afghanistan in 2001, spelled out the serious role the US and the international community would play in reconstruction, and plenty of help has been needed.

After relatively safe and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, one of the many threats to stability and security exists in warlords, local militias, and continued insurgency. These networks are funded for the most part by opium poppy cultivation, a thriving business in Afghanistan, which provides about 87% of the world’s total opium poppies. Although the revenue accounts for about 52% of the country’s GDP, the funds contribute to the movement of wanted individuals and possible terrorist funds, as well as feed into networks that traffic other things, like people and weapons. The commonly used term for these activities in Afghanistan is “narcoterrorism,” and much of the international community has labeled Afghanistan as a “narcostate” similar to Columbia.

ISAF doesn’t actively “combat” or “pursue” the perpetrators of these crimes, but their mission is to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security by tackling these issues in a variety of ways. In the past, this meant monitoring the elections, and since that time it has meant training the Afghan police force and what will essentially be “gendarmerie” and “national guardsmen.” The roughly 8,000 troops are also extensively involved in the reconstruction efforts, like the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs or monitoring the airport and airspace. To date though, the largest efforts have been put into counternarcotics programs. This includes traditional efforts like eradication, physically eliminating poppy fields, but it can also involve public information campaigns, letting those in the countryside know that it is actually illegal to grow, produce, traffic or use opium [poppies]. ISAF is also working to help the Afghan government create the necessary institutions to cope with these issues when the mandate expires.

The countries that have contributed troops to ISAF (as well as some other countries) also met January 31, 2006 to pledge additional funds to continue and expand counternarcotics efforts and other vital areas. For me, this is a significant example of the continued functioning of the transatlantic relationship, but also a perfect demonstration of how that relationship has changed. If the work in Afghanistan goes well, it might well provide a new mold for the future of that relationship. Even if it is unsuccessful, or less successful than desired, I still doubt that either side of the Atlantic will be ready or willing to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

-Catherine Kozak

The Real Problem with Europe

Most of what we've read so far for class has focused on the causes of the current transatlantic crisis, and whether or not it is mendable. Whether from the prospective of NATO, the EU, or individual states like Germany, France and the UK, Europeans are not agreeing with Americans as they (arguably) have in the past.

It seems to me, however, that the underlying truth of the matter is that Post-9/11 the United States is simply moving its foreign policy in a direction the Europeans can't follow. It has expanded its security interests globally, based on the assumption that instability abroad threatens security domestically. In this context, the peaceful, "post-modern" Europeans are of no longer of concern to the United States as they were in the Cold War, and because of their immobile and out-dated force structures they can hardly be expected to contribute in any real way. Giving international legitimacy, sure, but the US' global power status is pretty legimate on its own.

Several authors have made the claim that the United States is already on the decline, a superpower about to be eclipsed by a new up-and-comer. While bearing in mind the obvious difficulties of predicting the future, these recent events seem rather to characterize a United States that is more powerful than ever.

So the challenge for Europe is to craft a coherent (i.e. united as the EU) identity in response the this. But because there is still debate over and not acknowledgement of the changed geopolitical environment, Europeans have not been able to reach common consensus about the problem, let alone the solution. These guys really need to decided first and foremost who they want to be. And then do it.

-Mary Turkowski
mturkowski@gmail.com

The first post

This is the Transatlantic Relations blog for American University, Spring 2007.