It seems to me, however, that the underlying truth of the matter is that Post-9/11 the United States is simply moving its foreign policy in a direction the Europeans can't follow. It has expanded its security interests globally, based on the assumption that instability abroad threatens security domestically. In this context, the peaceful, "post-modern" Europeans are of no longer of concern to the United States as they were in the Cold War, and because of their immobile and out-dated force structures they can hardly be expected to contribute in any real way. Giving international legitimacy, sure, but the US' global power status is pretty legimate on its own.
Several authors have made the claim that the United States is already on the decline, a superpower about to be eclipsed by a new up-and-comer. While bearing in mind the obvious difficulties of predicting the future, these recent events seem rather to characterize a United States that is more powerful than ever.
So the challenge for Europe is to craft a coherent (i.e. united as the EU) identity in response the this. But because there is still debate over and not acknowledgement of the changed geopolitical environment, Europeans have not been able to reach common consensus about the problem, let alone the solution. These guys really need to decided first and foremost who they want to be. And then do it.
-Mary Turkowski
mturkowski@gmail.com
2 comments:
I would suggest the the US has not "expanded its security interests globally" as it already had global interests and a global strategy. It could be that i just see it differently but the US involvement in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Panama, Granada, and Iraq (to name the most recent interventions) are evidence of the Global reach of US strategy prior to 9-11. the fundamental difference as i see it is the US abandonment of containment for
"role-back." I'm not going to suggest that such an alteration in strategy is unwarranted but simply submit that it is--in my view--not a change is scope but in tactic.
I do agree about the inability of many European nations to commit forces meaningfully to out of area operations. the French didn't even have a refueling agreement with the Turks when they sent a fight wing to Afghanistan. they aren't ready...yet. I would point to the Europeans policing Yugoslavia and Lebanon however as examples of how, with the US heavily committed globally, the Europeans are helping filling gaps.
--Sam Hicks
This connects into the point Mead makes in the reading for 2/7:
"The conclusion seems sadly evident that the Bush administration is pragmatic rather than doctrinal when it comes to multilateral and unilateral options. It has proceeded without closer consultation with Germany and France because it has simply concluded that Germany and France demand more attention and consultation than their support is worth."
If gaining European support is more trouble than it's worth for the US what are the implications for Europeans? Will they become increasingly marginalized or is this an opportunity for them to find a new role?
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